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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 6 MAicH, 1969 NuME ER 1
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ZONING CASES-
NEW RULES?
Louis LEvy*
Beginning almost as early as the adoption of zoning laws
in Oklahoma nearly fifty years ago,' persons seeking relief
in state zoning cases have been permitted their "day in court."
Zoning litigants have had little difficulty during these years
in entering county court houses to present their grievances,
usually by the traditional means of injunctive relief. But
new rules recently announced by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court may have effectively closed the doors of the court-
houses throughout the state and, practically speaking, elimi-
nated any judicial review of zoning controversies. Attorneys
handling real estate matters should be cognizant of the new
developments in this field.
While not always victorious, zoning litigants have cus-
tomarily been afforded access to judicial review from deci-
*Louis Levy, B.A., L.L.B. Oklahoma University, Practic-
ing member of Tulsa County Bar Ass'n., Okla. Bar Ass'n.,
American Bar Ass'n.
1 Oklahoma adopted zoning laws in 1923, only seven years
after the adoption of America's first zoning law by New
York. The Oklahoma Buildings and Zoning Act, OKLA. STAT.
tit. 11, § § 401-10 (1961) has remained virtually unchanged
since its first writing. Later zoning laws can be found in
other statutes. See City Planning Commissions Act, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 11, § § 421-25 (1961); Regional Planning Commis-
sions Act., OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § § 431-37 (1961); Regional
Planning Commissions Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § § 854 1.9
(1961); Counties Containing City of 180,000 to 240,000 Popu-
lation Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § § 863. 1 to 5.23 (1961); and
City-County Planning and Zoning Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 19,
§ § 866.1-.34 (1961).
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sions of city councils in the courts. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court has not hesitated to entertain zoning actions since the
opportunity first presented itself in 1928,2 and it has written
over eighty zoning case opinions since that time.3 While this
number is not exceptionally large, the frequency of attack
upon local zoning practices has been on the increase as urban
areas continue to grow both in size and population.4
Yet, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has recently set forth
new guidelines for the judicial review of zoning cases orig-
inating in Oklahoma municipalities and carried to the local
district courts. These new rules are discussed in this article.
They deviate from former practices by eliminating original
court proceedings to set aside decisions of city councils in
zoning matters, while substituting a direct "appeal" process
for zoning cases.
2 This is contrary to the experience of the United States Su-
preme Court which has entertained only one other case
involving zoning facts since its landmark decision in Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
In that case, Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928), the Supreme Court cautioned state courts to look
closely at the facts in every case. The Court empowered
the lower courts to inquire into the reasonableness of a
particular local zoning ordinance and, where necessary, de-
clare the ordinance invalid if confiscatory when applied
to a specific tract of land.
8 A complete list of Oklahoma zoning cases is published by
the Zoning Committee of the Tulsa County Bar Associa-
tion, Beacon Building, Fourth and Boulder, Tulsa, Okla-
homa.
4 Professor Charles M. Haar, formerly of Harvard Law School,
notes that urban growth and the Supreme Court's up-
holding of legislation to deal with resulting problems con-
trasts with the earlier pronouncements of Blackstone who
wrote in the nineteenth century:
So great moreover is the regard of the law for
private property, that it will not authorize the least
violation of it; no, not even for the general good
of the whole community.
BLACKSTONE, COMENTArMES *139, quoted, in HA", LA=n
USE PLANNmG 410 (1959).
[Vol. 6, No. 1
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Until recently, state law has never known a zoning "ap-.
peal." Nor have zoning matters, leading to the ultimate adop-
tion or rejection of a municipal zoning ordinance, been con-
sidered anything other than "legislative" in character. Today,
however, the person who looks upon such hearings as in-
formal administrative or legislative proceedings runs afoul
of what may clearly be a new chapter in the judicial re-
view of zoning cases, for the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
has recently declared such hearings to be a "judicial" func-
tion, subject to "appeal" to the district courts, without an
evidentiary hearing.
What are the new rules? More importantly, are they
permanent? If permanent, is legislative reform needed? Ans-
wers to these questions are suggested here.
City of Sand Springs v. Colliver5
A strangely worded and legally disturbing recent deci-
sion by the Oklahoma Supreme Court may have abandoned
the concept that city councils, in acting upon zoning ordinanc-
es, are "law-making" and not "judicial" tribunals. The langu-
age of the opinion leaves little doubt that a change has oc-
curred. In the 1967 decision of City of Sand Springs v. Colliver
the court said:
When city commission exercises judicial function in
hearing and denying application for change in zoning
classification of plaintiff's property, appeal from such
order of the commission to the district court is author-
ized under 12 O.S. 1961, §951.6
The supreme court went further in the Sand Springs
case, however, in an apparent attempt to establish a new set
of rules to guide the trial courts in entertaining and review-
ing zoning controversies. Once having determined that city
councils are acting in a "judicial" capacity in deciding wheth-
er to adopt or reject a zoning ordinance, while failing ex-
5 434 P.2d 186 (Okla. 1967).
6 Id. at 187 (court syllabus; emphasis added).
19691
3
Levy: Judicial Review of Zoning Cases--New Rules
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1969
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
pressly to reverse numerous Oklahoma zoning cases incon-
sistent with this view,7 the court held that "... an appeal
authorized under §951 ... is not a trial de novo and the dis-
trict court is limited to appellate consideration of the case." 8
Relying upon an earlier Oklahoma decision in which a
direct appeal from a local administrative board exercising
quasi-judicial functions, and not legislative functions, was
taken to the district court,0 the court then stated that zon-
ing "appeals" should henceforth be restricted in the follow-
ing manner: (1) the appeal is perfected upon the filing of
a complete transcript of the proceedings, including tran-
script of evidence; (2) the statute does not provide trial de
novo in the district court; (3) the district court sits as an
appeal tribunal with jurisdiction limited to the transcript and
argument thereon; (4) determination on appeal is limited to
consideration of errors of law and whether the findings ap-
7 Until the Sand Springs case, the adoption of zoning laws
had uniformly been cited as a "legislative" function of city
councils. See DeLano v. City of Tulsa, 26 F.2d 640 (8th Cir.
1928); Preston v. City of Stillwater, 428 P.2d 215 (Okla.
1967); Bothchlett v. City of Bethany, 416 P.2d 613 (Okla.
1966); City of Tulsa v. Nicholas, 415 P.2d 917 (Okla. 1966);
Clouser v. City of Norman, 393 P.2d 827 (Okla. 1964); City
of Tulsa v. Swanson, 366 P.2d 629 (Okla. 1961); Higgin-
botham v. City of The Village, 361 P.2d 191 (Okla. 1961);
Oklahoma City v. Barclay, 359 P.2d 237 (Okla. 1960); Voight
v. Saunders, 243 P.2d 654 (Okla. 1952); Keaton v. Okla-
homa City, 187 Okla. 593, 102 P.2d 938 (1940); Hubbard
v. Oklahoma City 177 Okla. 263, 58 P.2d 547 (1936); Weav-
er v. Bishop, 174 Okla. 492, 52 P.2d 853 (1935); State ex.
rel. Hunzicker v. Pulliam, 168 Okla. 632, 37 P.2d 417 (1934);
Beveridge v. Harper & Turner Oil Trust, 168 Okla. 609, 35
P.2d 435 (1934); In re Dawson, 136 Okla. 113, 277 P.226
1928).
8 434 P.2d at 187 (court syllabus).
9 Reliance is placed on statements set forth in In re White,
335 P.2d 404 (Okla. 1960), a case involving the question
whether an "appeal" would lie from the order of a civil
service commission dismissing a police officer.
[Vol. 6, No. I
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pealed from are supported by the evidence introduced be-
fore the inferior tribunal; (5) where the decision of the in-
ferior tribunal is contrary to law, or the clear weight of the
evidence, the district court may render the decision which
should have been rendered.10
As if to erase all doubt of its intentions and continuing
to treat the matter at hand as a "judicial" act and thus ap-
pealable to the courts under section 951, the court said: "The
right extended plaintiff to appeal to the district court from
the City's denial of his application for change of zoning
classification cannot be questioned.""
Once having announced these new rules, the supreme
court proceeded to decide the facts of the case in favor of
the plaintiff landowner, who was seeking to use a tract of
land in the City of Sand Springs for construction of a retail
liquor store, and it sustained the decision of the trial court
which issued a "mandatory injunction"'12 prohibiting city of-
ficials from interfering with plaintiff's intended use of his
property. City officials had first told plaintiff that a zoning
change would be adopted if he would grant a waterline ease-
ment to the public across his land, but later rejected the re-
quested zoning change ordinance though the easement was
given. On the merits, one can hardly quarrel with the ulti-
mate result.
The road traveled by the supreme court to afford equit-
able relief in the Sand Springs case seems, at the very least,
a dubious route for zoning proceedings. If allowed to stand
unchallenged or unchanged, the new rules will effectively
close the courthouse doors to zoning litigants.
A Curious Statute
Plaintiff's attorney in the Sand Springs case elected to
proceed under the provisions of section 951-a unique deci-
10 434 P.2d at 191.
" Id.
12 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §951 (1961).
19691
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sion. No other zoning case has ever reached the supreme court
by this method. The correctness of counsel's decision, how-
ever, can no longer be questioned, in view of the court's hold-
ing that the statutory "appeal" method was proper. The cor-
rectness of the court's decision in this regard is another mat-
ter and is questionable in view of the language and history
of the statute. The statute provides:
A judgment rendered, or final order made, by any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial func-
tions, and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court,
may be reversed, vacated or modified by the district
court except where an appeal to some other court
is provided by law.13
A noted authority in the field of constitutional law has
taken the supreme court to task for its application of this
statute to a zoning proceeding. Writing for the Oklahoma
Association of Municipal Attorneys, Dr. Maurice H. Merrill
of the University of Oklahoma, examined the Sand Springs
case in the following manner:
City of Sand Springs v. Colliver . . . is a most in-
teresting case, in its disregard of the most elementary
principles of the separation of powers....
For some strange reason, the petitioner's attorney took
an appeal from the City Commissioner's refusal to
rezone under 12 O.S. 1961 ...
The contention that this was the proper procedure
seems upheld by the Supreme Court's ruling that the
evidence introduced by the city before the District
Court is not to be considered in determining whether
the court's judgment was correct. This is put on the
ground that review under 12 O.S. 1961, §951 is not
de novo but is upon the record before the tribunal be-
low. ...
This, of course, is good law, but the puzzling ques-
tion, to me, is how the Zegislative decision not to
amend the zoning ordinance gets transmitted into a
"judgment rendered, or final order made" by a "tri-
'E3 Id.
[Vol. 6, No. 1
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bunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions. ."
Surely, this is a remarkable decision in the area of
the distribution of powers governmental. The ulti-
mate result seems correct, but the method by which
it is reached may rise to plaque our judges many
times.14 (emphasis added).
It should be noted that Dr. Merrill views the result reach-
ed by the supreme court as correct, but the reasoning on
the remedial methods utilized erroneous. He found that there
was "very strong cornfield equity in favor of the owner and,
besides, it very well may have been that the zoning was, as
to his (plaintiff) property, unconstitutional since it deprived
the property of all useful value. "' Dr. Merrill conclud-
es his commentary:
[H]ad the action been one to enjoin the enforcement
of the ordinance against this property, the established
method of relief against unconstitutional acts, no ob-
jection could have been registered against the trial
court's grant of relief and the Supreme Court's af-
firmance. .... 16
It seems doubtful that the statute in question was ever
intended to apply to zoning decisions of city councils. Tradi-
tionally, such matters have not been labeled as "judicial"
functions nor are city councils "inferior in jurisdiction to the
district court" when passing upon legislation, any more so
than the House and Senate of the Oklahoma Legislature are
engaged in "judicial" conduct in consideration of legislative
proposals. Fortunately, the latter situation has not yet come
before the supreme court for inspection under the micro-
scopic eyes of section 951.
Historical analysis of the "appeal" statute, which has re-
mained unchanged since its adoption in 1910, shows it was
14 Merrill, Significant Recent Decisions Affecting Oklahoma
Municipalities, Oklahoma Ass'n of Municipal Attorneys 16-
17 (1968).
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intended as a "catch-all" remedy, providing a direct appeal
to the district courts from lower courts when no other statu-
tory remedy existed. Until the Sand Springs case, it had
never been used to review a decision of a city council in
a zoning change matter. Borrowed from the Kansas statutes
after the turn of this century, it has never been applied in
that state to allow the review of a purely legislative func-
tion.17
In Oklahoma the statute has been used most often to ap-
peal errors of law occurring in a justice of the peace court
to the district courts. In Bohart v. Anderson,8 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court strongly intimated that the statute was de-
signed to exclude all other proceedings by which judicial re-
view could be obtained from the decision of these "inferior"
tribunals.
In addition to appeals from justice of the peace courts,
other historically judicial functions have been appealed un-
der the provisions of this statute, including proceedings be-
fore a tax equalization board,19 the dismissal of public em-
ployees by city boards20 and an order of a local board grant-
ing a pension to a police officer.21
Zoning Is Not a Judicial Function
Is the supreme court correct in defining the action of a
city council "... . in hearing and denying application for
change in zoning classification . . ."22 as the exercise of a
"judicial function?" The answer to this question is the crux
of the problem discussed in this article, for, if such matters
17 KAN. STAT. AN. §60-2101 (1963).
18 26 Okla. 782, 110 P. 760 (1910).
19 Baldwin v. Board of Tax-Roll Corrections, 331 P.2d 412
(Okla. 1958).
, In re White, 355 P.2d 404 (Okla. 1960); Kutch v. Cosner,
202 Okla. 470, 215 P.2d 300 (1950).
21 City of Tulsa v. Board of Trustees, 387 P.2d 255 (Okla.
1963); In re Gruber, 89 Okla. 148, 214 P. 690 (1923).
22 See note 6 supra.
[Vol. 6, No. 1
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are not "judicial functions" within the contemplation of sec-
tion 951, then the court has clearly erred.
Traditionally, city councils, in the consideration of or-
dinances generally, have been adjudged by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court to be engaged in their "law-making" or "leg-
islative" role delegated to them by state law, and not engaged
in a "judicial function" in this endeavor. This is particularly
true in the field of zoning law. The court has in numerous
decisions, enunciated the rule that zoning laws are adopted
pursuant to the legislative powers delegated to cities and towns
as an adjunct of the police power and by the Oklahoma Zon-
ing Act.2 In zoning matters, municipalities act as the arm
of the state government.24 Zoning laws amount to a legisla-
tive classification of a particular parcel of land and the uses
to which it can be put.25 The rule is aptly stated in Beveridge
v. Harper & Turner Oil Trust26 as follows:
The municipalities of this state have been specifically
clothed with the power to zone by legislative enact-
ment. The proper exercise by municipalities of the
police power through zoning ordinances has received
the approval of this court ...
While jealously guarding their own authority to re-
view the use of power involved, courts at all times
recognize that their review is judicial in character, and
that the application of the police power to a parti-
cular situation is in the first instance a problem for
the legislative branch of the government .... 27
What is a "judicial function," as used within the con-
templation of section 951?
In In re Discharge of Earl White,28 the Oklahoma Su-
3 See id. at 187 nT, for a list of sixteen Oklahoma cases sup-
porting this rule.
24 In re Dawson, 136 Okla. 113, 277 P. 226 (1928).
25 Keaton v. Oklahoma City, 187 Okla. 593, 102 P.2d 938 (1940).
26 168 Okla. 609, 35 P.2d 435 (1934).
27 Id. at 613, 35 P.2d at 439-440 (emphasis added).
28 355 P.2d 404 (Okla. 1960).
19691
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preme Court took this question under consideration in a pro-
ceeding to review a city civil service commission order. Hold-
ing that the judicial "appeal" statute allowed a review of
this commission's findings, the court set forth the elements
required of a "judicial" function:
Where a Civil Service Commission, created by amend-
ment to a city charter, holds a hearing to determine
whether a city employee should be discharged by a
department head, swears witnesses, hears oral testi-
mony, receives stipulations made by the respective
attorneys, passes on objections to the admissibility of
testimony (sic) admits exhibits, in evidence, passes
upon offers of proof, hears argument of counsel for
both parties and submits written findings of facts and
enters judgment thereon, the Commission in conduct-
ing such hearing exercised a judicial rather than an
executive or administrative function.2
It would seem that the removal of public officers under
such circumstances is correctly classified as a "judicial" func-
tion. The problem of deciding what constitutes a "judicial"
function is not a new era of inquiry, nor is it peculiar to
Oklahoma. Kansas, from which our direct appeal statute was
taken, has also been concerned with the problem under a
similar law.0 The Kansas courts have never conclusively de-
29 Id. at 404 (court syllabus; emphasis added).
80 Kansas, from which the Oklahoma judicial appeal statute
was modeled, is in accord. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-2101
(1963), which reads as follows:
District courts. A judgment rendered or final or-
der made by a court or any other tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial func-
tions, and inferior in jurisdiction to the district
court, may be reversed, vacated or modified by
the district court. If no other means for perfecting
such an appeal is provided by law, it shall be suf-
ficient for an aggrieved party to file a notice that
he is appealing from such judgment or order with
such court, tribunal, board, or officer within thirty
thirty (30) days of its entry, and then causing true
[Vol. 6, No. I
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fined the expression but have discussed it in some noteworthy
cases, none of which involve the argument that the adoption
or rejection of a city ordinance is a judicial function. Ap-
parently this thought has not yet occurred in our sister state.
The meaning of the term "judicial" was discussed by the
Kansas court in State .ex rel. Brewster v. Mohler,3 1 where it
considered whether an act of the legislature conferred "judi-
cial power" on the Secretary of the State Board of Agricul-
ture. "Judicial power" said the court, "is the power to hear,
consider, and determine controversies between rival litigants
as to their personal or property rights, and must be regular-
ly invoked at the instigation of one of the litigants."3 2 No
such power was conferred upon the Secretary, ruled the court.
copies of all pertinent proceedings before such court,
tribunal, board or officer to be prepared and filed
with the clek of the district court of the county in
which such judgment or order was entered. The
clerk shall thereupon docket the same as an action
in the district court, which court shall then proceed
to review the same, either with or without addition-
al pleadings and evidence, and enter such order or
judgment as justice shall require. A deposit as se-
curity for costs shall be required by the clerk of
the district court as in the filing of an original
action. When an action is filed in the district court
on appeal or removal from an inferior court the
jurisdiction of the district court shall not be limit-
ed to only such matters as were within the juris-
diction of the lower court, and the district court
may by order permit the issues to be enlarged in
the same manner and to the same extent as if the
action had been originally commenced in the dis-
trict court.
See also prefatory note to § 60-2101, which gives de-
tailed discussion of the history of the new statute.
31 98 Kan. 465, 158 P. 408 (1916), aff'd sub nom. Payne v.
Kansas ex. rel. Brewster, 248 U.S. 112 (1918).
32 Id. at 471, 158 P. at 410.
1969]
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Another test was stated in Shawnee County Commission-
ers v. Wright, 3 where the same court considered unmeritori-
ous a claim that the state tax commission acted judicially in
making an order. In ruling against the plaintiff, the court
said: "At any rate, what was done by the tax commission
was not judicial. Its order does not have the effect of a judg-
ment.3
4
While there is considerable authority defining the words
"judicial function", it would seem that the general American
rule is that the adoption or rejection of municipal ordinances
is clearly "legislative" in character. 5 The writer concurs in
this view.
"Appeal"--An Unfortunate Term
Laymen speak of zoning controversies lodged in the courts
as being an "appeal" from a decision of the city council. The
term should, in this writer's opinion, never be used in this
sense by attorneys even for the sake of convenience, unless
specific reference to the type of proceeding in the Sand Springs
case is intended. The term does not adequately describe what
is in reality an original or collateral proceeding in the dis-
trict courts for specific and extraordinary relief, i.e., injunc-
tion, mandamus, etc. The so-called zoning "appeal" referred
to by the layman is a direct attack upon a law-making de-
cision.
The term "appeal" has apparently found its way into the
field of zoning law by continued reference to the type of
judicial review allowed in board of adjustment cases3 where
direct appeals are specifically provided by statute.8 These
boards are quasi-judicial tribunals, and their actions and or-
ders should not be confused with the enactment of zoning
33 153 Kan. 19, 109 P.2:d 184 (1941).
34 Id. at 34, 109 P.2d at 194.
85 8 E. McQumLAx, THE LAW OF MuNcIPAL CORPORATIONS
§25.54 (3d ed. 1965).
36 OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 408 (1961).
(Vol. 6, No. 1
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 6 [1969], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol6/iss1/2
ZONING CASES
laws, which only city councils are empowered to adopt. Ap-
peals to the district courts from orders and decisions of zon-
ing boards of adjustment are taken in the manner prescrib-
ed by statute, by serving upon the city officers involved a
notice of appeal which serves as the beginning of the re-
view process. In addition a copy37 is always filed in the dis-
trict court. The statute providing for these appeals must be
meticulously followed to perfect an appeal in cases of alleged
hardship or when errors of law are asserted. Failure to com-
ply with statutory procedure deprives the courts of jurisdic-
tion to entertain the appeal. 38
The Oklahoma Zoning Act,39 however, is silent on the
question of judicial review of decisions of city councils adopt-
ing or rejecting zoning changes. For this reason alone, the
term "appeal" should not be used when referring to such
matters. 40 Normally, the action will be to enjoin city officials
from acting in a manner alleged to be arbitrary, unreason-
able or capricious, either in refusing to adopt a zoning change
or in refusing to reject a zoning amendment. In either case,
constitutional problems of due process, equal protection of
the law or variances from procedural requirements are com-
monly found in the cases on the subject.
Traditional Remedies
A number of difficult, albeit traditional, remedies have
been used to plead zoning cases since the adoption of the
Oklahoma Zoning Act in 1923.
7 Id.
38 Jefferson v. British Am. Oil Prod. Co., 193 Okla. 599, 145
P.2d 387 (1943).
89 Buildings and Zoning Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, §§401-10
(1961).
40 See City of Tulsa v. Board of Trustees 387 P.2d 255, 258
(Okla. 1963):
"[T]he word 'appeal', like the term 'law suit', us-
ually connotes an adversary proceeding in, and of
itself, connotes a bilateral disagreement, as distin-
guished from a unilateral matter."
19691
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Injunction: Suits have frequently been brought in the
courts to enjoin, restrain and prohibit local officials or zon-
ing agencies from enforcing the provisions of an act or con-
duct alleged to be unconstitutional, and the remedy of in-
junction is the one most commonly pleaded by petitioners
seeking relief in this case. Thus, the remedy of injunction
has been allowed to prohibit city officials from interfering
with a restaurant located upon land zoned for homes where
the zoning was adopted under an invalid law,41 to prohibit
issuance of a building permit for construction of a shopping
center under a city ordinance changing the zoning classifi-
cation of particular property from residential to business
use,42 to enjoin city officials from enforcing certain zoning
ordinances prohibiting the sale of non-intoxicating beverages
of 3.2% alcoholic content where these ordinances were in
conflict with state laws regulating the sale thereof,43 to abate
the sale of fruits and vegetables upon land zoned for resi-
dential purposes,44 and to enjoin a city from prohibiting the
use of property on a major street for a gasoline filling sta-
tion.45 Other cases in which injunctions were sought, but
denied on their facts by the supreme court, are abundantly
cited in the reports of Oklahoma decisions. 46
Mandamus: The remedy of mandamus has also been sought
in zoning cases, normally to obtain issuance of a building per-
mit for the construction of a building in an area inconsistent-
ly zoned. In the cases the petitioner generally attacks the
zoning ordinance as being unconstitutional. In Magnolia Petro-
41 Elias v. City of Tulsa, 408 P.2d 517 (Okla. 1965).
42 Higginbotham v. City of The Village, 361 P.2d 191 (Okla.
1961).
43 7-Eleven, Inc. v. McClain, 422 P.2d 455 (Okla. 1967).
44 Suter v. City of Okmulgee, 373 P.2d 527 (Okla. 1962).
45 City of Tulsa v. Swanson, 366 P.2d 629 (Okla. 1961).
46 See Oklahoma City v. Barclay, 359 P.2d 237 (Okla. 1960);
Shaw v. Calvary Baptist Church, 184 Okla. 454, 88 P.2d 327
(1939); Royal Baking Co. v. Oklahoma City, 182 Okla. 45,
75 P.2d 1105 (1938).
(Vol. 6, No. I
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leum Co. v. City of Tonkawa,47 petitioner successfully alleged
it was entitled to a building permit for a gasoline filling sta-
tion upon land zoned for business buildings within the city
limits against the contention by city officials that the ordin-
ance permitting that use had been lawfully repealed, and the
court said:.
The record discloses that the plans and specifications
for the proposed addition to the plaintiff's filling
station met all of the requirements prescribed by or-
dinance . . . that same were submitted to the City
Clerk and the required fees paid; that under the terms
of such ordinance, the City Clerk and the Mayor must
issue the building permit, when the provisions thereof
are complied with, they being granted no discretion-
ary powers thereunder. Since the property is located
in an area zoned for business buildings, and since
the plaintiff has complied with all the provisions of
said ordinance, the issuance of the permit is purely a
ministerial act. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to
such building permit as a matter of right....4s
Petitioners in at least two other Oklahoma zoning cases
have failed to obtain a building permit through the remedy
of mandamus, either because the ordinance under which the
permit was sought was declared invalid,49 or because the zon-
ing change permitting the requested use was not adopted by
the city council.50
Habeas Corpus: Once arrested for the violation of a city
zoning ordinance, may a petitioner seek his release from jail
by means of the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus? At
least one Oklahoma case indicates that he may attempt this
route. He may attack the constitutionality of the zoning or-
dinance in the proceeding, even, as in the instance referred
47 189 Okla. 125, 114 P.2d 474 (1941).
48 Id. at 126, 114 P.2d at 475.
49 Voight v. Saunders, 206 Okla. 318, 243 P.2d 654 (Okla. 1952).
60 Shanbour v. Oklahoma City, 422 P.2d 444 (Okla. 1967).
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to here, where the complainant is unsuccessful in gaining his
release."1
If the new rules announced in City of Sand Springs v.
Colliver are to become the law in this jurisdiction, actions
for injunction, mandamus or other extraordinary relief may
be a relic of the past in the review of zoning cases. The irony
of the new rules is that they are set forth in a decision in
which both the trial court and the supreme court directed
the issuance of a "mandatory injunction" prohibiting city
officials from interfering with the construction by plaintiff
of a retail liquor store upon his land. 2 Did the court really
intend to do violence to the separation of powers doctrine?53
Exclusive Remedy?
As set-forth earlier, the customary method for relief in
zoning litigation has been injunction. Thus, the typical plea is
for a decree enjoining the enforcement by city officials of
an invalid zoning ordinance, particularly as it may apply
to a landowner's specific property.54 Injunction is a popular
remedy in the United States and is commonly found in most
.jurisdictions which have adopted the provisions of the Stand-
ard Zoning Enabling Act, first proposed by the federal De-
partment of Commerce in 1926. In addition to the aforemen-
tioned customary remedy, mandamus, declaratory judgment
and certiorari, when otherwise permitted by statute, are al-
so existent remedies available to petitioners in most states.
The language of the Sand Springs case, however, sug-
gests that any of these original proceedings brought to test
a city council zoning decision is a remedy no longer avail-
'1 In re Reynolds, 328 P.2d 441 (Okla. Crim. 1958).
52 434 P.2d at 187.
53 The writer of this article has had the opportunity to read
appellate briefs submitted to the supreme court in the Sand
Springs case. Significantly, the question whether zoning
involves an exercise of "law-making" or "judicial" power
was not raised in these briefs.
54 Cases cited note 50 supra.
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able in Oklahoma. Has injunction, mandamus, declaratory
judgment or habeas corpus been ruled out? The true and cor-
rect remedy, implies the court, is that of an "appeal" under the
provisions of section 951. The appeal must be taken by filing
a "complete transcript,"56 cannot be "de novo," and the de-
termination of the examining magistrate is "limited to con-
sideration of errors of law."581 Only the written transcript is
reviewable, and no new evidence may be admitted for the
courts consideration. 9 Implied, but not stated, is the rule that
a demurrer or other preliminary motion attacking the suf-
ficiency of a cause of action not alleging existence of a tran-
script of evidence taken at the city council level will be sus-
tained upon jurisdiction grounds.
An inevitable query is raised by these statements. Is the
device of judicial "appeal" exclusive under the new doctrines?
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has not affirmed this view
explicitly, nor is the question presented for argument in City
of Sand Springs v. Colliver. Nevertheless, trial courts through-
out the state are beginning to interpret the language of the
case in this manner, and with some justification.60 Summary
judgments in zoning cases, absent transcripts of evidence be-
low, are becoming commonplace. In at least one recent trial
court judgment a specific finding to this effect was entered.6 '
55 Buildings and Zoning Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, §§ 401-10
(1961).




60 The supreme court stated in the Sand Springs case: "[Tihe
proceeding is not a trial de novo and the district court is
limited to appellate consideration of the case." 434 P.2d
at 187 (court syllabus; emphasis added.)
18 O'Rourke v. City of Tulsa, No. 115173 (Dist. Ct., Tulsa
County, Okla. Dec. 26, 1967).
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Current Confusion
Assuming the permanency of the rulings in the Sand
Springs case, city councils must conduct evidentiary hearings,
either through the use of special masters or longer meetings
which will be time-consuming, costly and, to say the least,
novel. Whatever the new procedures devised for these ad-
ninistrative hearings, ultimate decisions must eventually be
made by the city council on zoning changes, for it and not
the courts has the power to adopt ordinances.6 2 This function
is specifically delegated to city councils by the Oklahoma
Zoning Act.0
Either solution mentioned here will meet opposition on
the local scene. City councils neither desire to pose as judges
nor are they normally qualified to rule upon hearsay ex-
positions or objections made at other evidentiary disclosures.
They are elected to legislate, not adjudicate. In some cases,
city councils will refuse to comply with the new rules, fear-
ing that heretofore informal hearings will soon be converted
to adversary proceedings for which no established procedures
exist, and which will require every applicant for a zoning
change to employ an attorney familiar with the rules of evi-
dence.
At least one city in Oklahoma, Tulsa, has appealed to the
judges of the district court to forestall additional zoning hear-
ings until new appeals can be perfected to the supreme court
to clarify the Sand Springs case. As an alternative, the city
attorney has suggested informal agreements among attorneys
for zoning litigants, or stipulations to allow zoning review by
means of the traditional remedy of injunction.G4 At best it
seems that such a solution is a temporary device, and un-
duly permissive.
Most cities have simply ignored the Drowem in hopes
62 OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 401 (1961).
Id.
6 See Tulsa Tribune, June 27, 1968, § 1, at 12, col. 1.
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that it does not really exist or that it will soon evaporate.
If the zoning cases in the Tulsa area are examples, 5 then
neither of these escapes has much merit.
CONCLUSION
The new rules guiding judicial review in zoning, if not
changed by the supreme court in subsequent decisions or by
curative legislation, will be difficult for cities and towns in
Oklahoma to observe. The possibility that classification of
zoning decisions as judicial rather than legislative in scope
could easily be extended to the consideration of city ordinanc-
es in other fields, is a rather inappropriate result and not one
to be desired. Clarification is greatly needed.
In the interim, city council discussion of zoning items
should be accompanied with transcribed records for preser-
vation as court evidence, rulings on competency and admissi-
bility having to await proper objection should a judicial re-
view develop. Witnesses should be sworn and petitions should
be verified, for a "judicial function" is being exercised by
the city council.
EDITOR'S NOTE: Shortly before publication of this ar-
ticle, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided O'Rourke v. City
of Tulsa, (1969). The O'Rourke case specifically overrules
Sand Springs v. Colliver, 434 P.2d 186 (1968), and returns
zoning activities of municipalities to their former status as
legislative rather than judicial functions. Mr. Levy's argu-
ments against the Sand Springs position now have judicial
backing from Oklahoma's highest court.
5 Local courts in the Tulsa area refuse to entertain judicial re-
view in zoning cases today unless the requirements of City
of Sand Springs v. Colliver, 434 P.2d 186 (Okla. 1967) are
strictly followed, an impossible task under current pro-
cedures prevailing in city council meetings, where no
sworn testimony exists and a legally competent "eviden-
tiary" record or transcript cannot be made.
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